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 
 Semanticists should be the obstetricians not the coroners of
programming languages John Reynolds
Recently there has been phenomenal growth in the use of the Internet
through the World Wide Web Especially interesting is the emergence of so
called  web languages such as Java
 
  which support the development
of programs that can be downloaded to a client	s machine for execution by
a web browser This brings power and 
exibility to web applications but
it also brings wellknown endpoint security problems such as the threat
of integrity and unauthorized disclosure attacks  Yet although security
has been an issue in web language design there appears to be no formal
characterization of the kinds of security properties that one can expect of
programs written in these languages
A web language should we believe be designed so that all programs
are guaranteed to satisfy explicitlystated security properties To this end
we advocate a more systematic approach to the design of secure web lan
guages One begins with a core language for which some set of desired
security properties can be shown to hold with respect to a formal semantics
The language is then incrementally extended to include new features as
necessary At each step the designer has an obligation to establish that the
security properties have been preserved
For example one kind of attack a web language should guard against
is a disclosure attack where a malicious program downloaded by a client
attempts to make the contents of certain private les public In response one
might use discretionary access control mechanisms to simply forbid access
to sensitive information or to limit access to output devices But such
restrictions would likely render many applications useless
For example a downloaded mail tool would need access to a client	s
sensitive mailfolder and to a nonsensitive publiclywritable directory like
 tmp for message composition and replies However granting such access
rights requires care since a mail tool might now be able to copy a client	s
entire mailfolder to  tmp
 
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Java is a registered trademark of Sun Microsystems Inc

There is a form of static analysis however that can be applied to pro
grams to protect against disclosure attacks while allowing utilities like mail
tools to access les and directories at dierent sensitivity levels It is called
secure information  ow analysis and it was pioneered by Dorothy Denning
 We brie
y describe how a type system can be imposed on a simple
imperative language to guarantee secure information 
ow In part we il
lustrate how well type theory can be applied to address a security problem
but our main point is that the security theorem stated below actually guides
the language designer in evaluating potential language extensions
To begin with we suppose that we have a partial order of security classes
   For simplicity we may consider just two classes L low and H high
where L represents nonsensitive information and H represents sensitive in
formation There is a natural subtyping among these classes based on the
observation that L information can safely be considered to beH information
but not vice versa Thus L   H
To type the phrases of the language we use three forms of types   for
expressions   var for variables and   cmd for commands For example
we might have x  L var to indicate that x is a variable that holds values
of type L The rule for typing an assignment x  e requires that x    var
and e     So if y  H var  the assignment y  x is legal since the value
of x can be coerced to H but the assignment x  y is illegal Also the
assignment x   is legal since literals are taken to have type L
More subtly we also want the conditional
if eveny then x   else x  
to be illegal because this results in an implicit 
ow of information from y to
x To achieve this we give commands types of the form   cmd  A command
c has type   cmd only if every variable assigned to in c has type at least





     The rule for typing assignments says that if x    var and e    
then x  e    cmd  The rule for typing conditionals says that if e    
c    cmd  and c

   cmd  then if e then c else c

   cmd  The conditional
if eveny then x   else x   is illegal then because eveny only has
type H and x   does not have type H cmd 
The value of this type system is given by a security theorem which
is a property known as noninterference  It asserts intuitively that no
information can 
ow from H variables to L variables 
Theorem Suppose that program c is well typed and  and 
are two memories that agree on all L variables If c terminates









agree on all L variables
Many challenges remain before a truly secure web programming environ
ment can be developed However we believe that theorems of this kind are
necessary in any web language that hopes to provide secure web computing
By taking security into account at the outset of language design one can

get a handle on what kind of language is possible if a particular security
property is expected to hold For instance notice that the security theorem
above requires c to terminate successfully when run on memories  and 
This means that if it should terminate abnormally on  or  then the po
tential for interference exists in any language with the ability to detect such
status Unfortunately this capability can be found in languages that return
the exit status of a process or generate and handle exceptions So extending
the simple language with such features can be dangerous The point here is
that the systematic approach leads us to the discovery
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